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At its sitting of LZ February I98I the European Parliament
referred the motion for a resolution by Mr VAN MIERT and Mr GLINNE
(Doc. L-899/80) on Afghanistan to its Political Affairs Committee.
At its meeting on 2I to 23 April I98I the committee decided
to draw up a report.
At its meeting on 13 to 15 May 1981 it appointed Mr Gerard
ISRAEL rapporteur.
The committee considered the report at its meetings of
L9/20 October 198I, L0/LL November I98I, 2-4 December 1981,
27-29 January L982, 24-26 February L982 and 28-30 April L982.
On 26 tlay L982 it adopted the motion for a resolution by 19
votes to 13 with no abstentions.
The following took part in the votei t*lr Rumor, chairman;
Mr Haagerup and Lord BetheII, vice-chairmen; Mr Israel,
rapporteuri Mr Antoniozzit, ltr Berkhouwer, Mr Bettiza, Mr Bocklet
(deputizing for Mr Klepsch), Iulr Bournias, Mrs Charzat (deputizing
for Mr l{otchane), Lady Elles, Mr Ephremidis, Mr Fellermaier
(deputizing for l'1r Brandt), Mr Fergusson, l,1r B. Friedrich,
Irlrs Gaiotti de Biase (deputizing for Mr Barbi), tlr Galluzzi
(deputizing for Mr Segre) r Mrs Gredal, Mr Habsburgr Mr H5nsch,
Ivlr von Hassel, Itlr Jaguet, l'1r Katzer (deputizing for Mr Deschamps),
l"1r llajonica (deputizing for Mrs Lenzl , Mr I'tommersteeg (deputizing
for Mr Diligent), Mr Penders, l{r Plaskovitis, Mr Prag (deputizing
for Sir James Scott-Hopkins) r ttr Radoux (deputizing for Mr Van Miert),
Mr Romualdi, Mr SchaII, Mr Schieler and Mr Walter (deputizing for
I"1rs van den Heuvel).
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AThe Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European parliament
the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statenont:
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
on the situation in Afghanistan
The European Parliament,
A having regard to the motion for
on Afghanistan (Doc. 1-899/80),
a resolution by Mr VAN Ir{IERT and l,[r Cf,fUllS
whereas in December 1979 Soviet troops crossed the international frontier
separating the USSR and Afghanistan,
whereas since that date Afghanistan has been occupied by the USSR with an
expeditionary force of 90r0O0 men,
whereas there is no legal basis for the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan,
E whereas the present government in Afghanistan, set up by the Soviets,
cannot claim to represent the Afghan people,
F whereas'the Soviet occupation has led to a major uprising by the Afghan
peoples, both against the de facto government and against the foreign
occupying power,
G whereas the policy of repression pursued by the Kabul authoritiqs has
the powerful support of the Soviet occupying forces,
H whereas human rights in Afghanistan are being blatantly and systematically
violated by the Soviet army and government forces,
I whereas oppression - the deportation of whole communities, particularly
in the Khumar valley, air attacks on rural populations, the destruction
of entire villages, and, lastly, the fporadic uee of chemical weapons to
slaughter hundreds of thousands of people - is a daily occurrence on
I.fghn soir.
iI whereas almost 3 million Afghans have taken refuge in Pakietan and Iran
in order to escape the repression, the Afghan refugee problem having
become the most important issue of this kind in the world at present,
f-wnCieas armed popular ?-es-Fstance movements have spontan-ebtsly-ar-iEen;-
pledged to fight against the foreign occupying power and the regime
installed by that power,
L whereas fierce fighting has taken place between a powerfully, orgaglr?a 
.,
Soviet armed force equipped with modern weapons and including pergonnel
trained in the techniques of total warfare, and a population of mountain
dwellers armed with makeshift weapons and lacking equipment and loglatic
support,
,f
I
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(e) enphasizing to the variors resistance ro\refiEnts that t]E formation of a un[fied
National LiSeration l,loverent representing the great majority of the resistance
fighters and of tlre pry1$Atic,n rrcuId facilitate the granting of, $.rch ald and
Frepare t}le way for official recognition of the lvb\rerEnt, by tle lGrber States
of t}te E\:ropean Ccnnn-uity and by the iaternatiqral ccrnn:ni-ty, as the legitJmate
representatirrc of tle Mghan pecple;
(f) minister5ng permarently to tfre heal-th, food, Ieducatioml and cultural rnedb of
Afqtun rglqgees,
(s) considering alr negotiations with the ussR to be rna& tlrort--
diffictflt, paptioularly on rmtt€rs concernfurg Egopearl 
.
security, as long as the occupation of Afghanistan continues i _
(h) if the occupation of Afghanistan continues, envisaging a concerted
policy with the united states and Japan involving a review of the
principle of supplying to the USSR advanced technologies with
military or space research potential;
(i ) reaffirming that the fuII exercise of the right to self-determination
by the Afghan people is incompatibre with the soviet occupation;
(j ) not ruring out, however, the possibility of obtaining grlarantees
from the South-East Asian countries bordering on Afghanistan and
their allies that they wourd not interfere in the affairs of
Afghanistan if a normal situaiion, based on soviet withdrawar agd
respect for the freely expressed will 0f the Atghan pcopler wl3
fully restoredi
urges the Foreign Ministers of the Member states of the community
meeting in political cooperation to work out detaired rules for the
implementation of a policy of the Ten based on the principles enumerated
in paragraph 2 abovei
Decides, for its part, to establish on-going relations with the
parliaments of the countries that are concerned at the gravity of the
present situation in Afghanistani
5. Calls on the Comrnission to report Oo Parliament within three months
on new measures that could be adopted to assist the Afghan refugees;
rnstructs its President to forward this resolution to the council, the
commission and the Foreign lrlinisters of the Member states of the
Community meeting in political cooperation. ' 
,
t
3.
4.
6.
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BEXPLANATORY STATEMENT
For the first time since the end of the Second World War, the Soviet
Union has openly undertaken a military intervention in a country beyond its
frontiers and its sphere of influence which covers the countries belonging
to the Warsaw Pact. The invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 is
therefore a significant new departure to which the West should be able to
respond in an appropriate and practical manner. We must, however, admit
that so far no measures have been taken to hinder the USSR in the development
of its new strategy apart from essentially discursive measures of a political
nature
1. The Soviet intervention
In April 1978 a revolution took place in Afghanistan which resulted in
a government of national unity led by l,lohammed TARAKI taking Power. Although
in the initial period the new government carried out a number of reforms,
especiatly land reform, discontent grew as the months passed. The events in
Iran and the enormous impact of '.he ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini on the
fervently Muslim rural population, together with the hopes placed by some
sectors of the population in the government of neighbouring Pakistan, led
to sporadic demonstrations against the ruling Communist r6gime. On
14 February 1979, Mr Adolph DULS, the US Ambassador in Kabul, was abducted
by the members of the 'Setem-i-!1e11i' group and then killed during an attack
made in an attempt to free him. On 27 llarch, President TARAKI decided to
share power with HAFIZULLAH AMIN, whom he appointed Prime llinister. By late
summer 1979 there were five thousand Soviet advisers in Afghanistan, the
strength of the Soviet air force in the country had increased considerably
and a senior Russian official appointed by the Kremlin occupied the office
next to that of President TARAKI. At the same time, virtually the whole
country was in a state of rebellion. Provinces such as Konar and Paktia
were in rebel hands. Since it could no longer rely on the regular army
from which soldiers deserted in droves, the Afghan Government began calling
on Soviet air power. At the same time there was a significant exodus of
thepopulationtowardsPakistan,(inparticularthenomadicBaluchis)
while the Hazaras, Shia lluslims, turned towards lran.
on I0 September 1979, following an internal power struggle,
president TARAKI was replaced by Prime I'linister AII{IN, although the Soviets,
now omnipotent in Kabut, were alleged to have done their utmost to bring
about the opposite result.
AMIN then conducted a savage policy of oppression against the rebels
and pitilessly hunted down the supPorters of TARAKI, who were in league
with the Soviets.
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. That is the background against which the massive intervention of Soviet
troops took place on 27 December )-9'19, at a time when the plight of the
American hostages in Teheran was becoming increasingly serious.
In an interview in Pravda (13 January 1980), President BREZHNEV
justified this invasion: 'Afghanistan demanded an end to aggression
and that it be allowed to build a new life for itself in peace. Already
under President TARAKI, and also at a later date, the Afghan leaders,
encountering external aggression, called on the Soviet Union for assistance
on more than one occasionr.
It will be noted that Mr BREZIINEV said'Iater'and that this must
be a reference to the AMIN Government. But it would have been inconceivable
for the enemy of the Soviets to call on them to intervene. Had he done so,
this appeal would have been worthless in Russian eyes, since the Soviets
were denouncing the iltegality of the AI4IN government, which was the de
facto government when Soviet combat troops invaded Afghanistan. At all
events, AI{IN was killed by the Soviets on the very day that they entered
Kabu1.
In fact, t'tr BREZHNEV was referring to an appeal made by President TARA"(I
before his death to the Soviet Government. But it should be noted that there
is a distinct difference between the action taken by the USSR in Afghanistan
before December 1979 and that undertaken after that date, i.e. after TARAKI's
death.
The Soviet claim will not stand up to an investigation based on law
and the facts, and the intervention of December 1979 must be regarded as
i1legal unless we accept the idea that TARAKI appealed to the USSR from
beyond the grave.
2. The Soviet occuPation
The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan is not massive and
cannot be compared, for example, with the American intervention in Vietnam.
No more than 85,000 Russian soldiers are occupying this country which has
16 million inhabitants and covers an area of 650,000 km2.
This minimat commitment, which is principally designed to restrict
the national and internatj-onal repercussions of the operation, forces the
USSR to pursue a very specific strategy. It occupies the towns and controls
the major trunk routes, while the Afghan army plays a very limited and
static role because of ihe large numbers of deserters. In addition, the
use of aircraft and armoured vehicles limits its losses considerably.
It is not involved in pacifying operations such as those carried out
during the Algerian war, for example, when hundreds of thousands of men
were deptoyed. Consequently, the Russians claim to have lost no more
t.han 6,000-8,000 men in 1980. But this strategy has one major drawback
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in that it atlows freedom of movement for the poputation living on the
border with Pakistan, especially on the frontier of Konar and Paktia'
As a result, contacts are frequent between the two sides of the frontier.
Heavy bombardments of these regions have, however, forced a large number
of people to leave the area, and this has resulted in the isolation of
the rebels crossing from Pakistan who find very 1ittle logistic supPort'
According to a report by ltr Atexander HAIG submitted to the united
states congress oo 22 March 1982, the soviet union is using chemical
warfare in Afghanistan. The US document refers to 47 statements indicating
that attacks with toxic weaPons took place and resulted in the death of
more than 3ooo people between the summers of 1979 and 1981. Of these
47 statements, 36 were made by deserters from the soviet-controlled
Afghan dErtllr resistance fighters, journalists who had visited the area or
doctors.
The report by the US Secretary of State claims that Soviet heficoPters
are spraying clouds of toxic vapour or firing shelIs or bombs containing
poisonous gas. Mines containing toxic substances are also said to have
been dropped.
The nredical evidence states that the victims displayed often fatal
lesions caused by toxic substances such as yperite (mustard gas),
phosgene and, possibly, trichotheccne. Medical- examinations of the
casuaLties revealed cutaneous lesions, Partial or complete paralysis of the
Iimbs, injuries to the respiratory organs and damage to the nervous
system which often resulted in death'
I,1r HAIG also considers in his report why the Russians are using
chemical warfare of this kind. In the light of similar chemical
attacks carried out in Cambodia and Laos by the Russians' Vietnamese
aIlies on the resisting H'mong highlanders, a definite strategy is seen
as being pursued. The aim of this is to undermine the will to resist
of those sections of the indigenous populatlon opposed to the government
by destroying them even in relatively inaccessible areas of natural
sanctuary.
on the other hand, your raPporteur is obliged to point out that
a hospital run by the International Red cross which opened in the
peshawar area in April 1981 and has since admitted approximatelv a thousand
patients has not encountered a single case of injuries caused by
chemical weapons.
It would appear, therefore, that if such oPerations have been
carried out by the Soviet Army,they took place only sporadically and
at the beginning of the conflict.
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In these circumstancesrbearing in mind the limited number of
losses and the relatively low cost of the operation, the Soviets can
continue to occupy Afghanistan indefinitely. They simply need to monitor
any changes occurring in Lhe international context and any progress made
by ihe AfEiran resistance.
3. The Afqhan resistance
Unlike the conventionat scenario for a war waged by a resistance
movement, i.e. beginning wi-th a small number of rebels and then snowballing
as ii gains the support of the people, the Afghan rebellion was immediate
and total. It involved every sector of society from the outset. The
general nature of the rebellion stems from the fact that the party in power
is Communist and aiheist. There are two main streams to this resistance:
on the one hand the fundamentalists, supported by some t'lustim countries,
and on the other an Islamic nationalist movement which is more or less
modern in its outlook.
Unfortunately, as the author of a report by the International Institute
for Strategic Studies, London, writesl: 'No resistance movement (in
Afghanistan) has an overalt strategy, organizational concepts appropriate
to the situation, specific knowledge of the adversary's nature, or an
assessnent of the international situation which might be used as 'the
basis for its tactics. Finally, none of them has that infinitely valuable
component required for a lengthy guerilLa war: trained personnel who can
act as links with the people and merge into the background'.
In addition, the Afghan resistance faces a considerable external
problem. Its adversdrlr the USSR, is a totalitarian state which is not
accustomed to negotiate solutions to problems which might affect its own
security.
In fact, where in a liberal democracy a certain public weariness
may lead a government, against its better judgmentl to put an end to a
colonial-type war, or where international disapproval may sometimes
compel a government to negotiate with national liberation movements,
the USSR remains impervious to such considerations.
I G6rard CHALIAND 'Report on the Afghan resistance' 1980-81
-L2- PE 74.a79/tin.
TheAfghanresistancealsosuffersfromaconsiderablelackof
coltcl;ion llctwt.cn tlte v.lri()us ntovt-t,t('ltt'rr whit'h nt;tkc it rtp' an<l it is
affectedbyinternalideologicalstruggleswhicharefrequentlythe
outcome of secular quarrels' It is heavily marked by ethnic or
religiousstrugglesbetweenitsvariouscomPonentsand'finally'
cannot hope for a negotiated solution' As things stand' it cannot
cause the soviet union enough problens for it to hope that it will 
be
successfulandthatthecountrywillbeliberated.
Nevertheless,itshouldbepointedoutthatapoliticalwillto
unite the Afghan resistance emerged in June 1981, when an agreement
was signed creating the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujaheddin' This
allianceisledbyapresidiumwhosclmembersincludcMrMohammadi,
Mr Mufaddahi and Mr Garlani. RePresentatives of the alliance visited
Europe in the spring of 1982' In Florence' at the initiative of our
colleague Mr Ripa di Meana, they met most of the leading European
figureswithaspecialinterestintheAfghanresistance.Theywere
received by the President of the European Parliament in strasbourg,
a meeting at which your rapPorteur, Lord Bethell and Mr Ripa di Meana
werepresent.ThealliancerepreSentativessetouttheir'waraims'
and stated their desire never to resort to international terforism
and to respect human rights, in particular the rights of prisoners of
s,ar. on this last point, it has been confirmed that negotiations are
in progress with representatives of the International Red Cross with
aviewtoreachinganagreement$,iththeRussians.Aprocedure
involving the internment of prisoners on neutral territory is under
active consideration.
Itisquiteconceivab}e,therefore,thatSomedegreeofpolitical
unitymaybeestablishedwithintheresistanceonthebasisofthe
principles referred to above. In such circumstances, there is no
doubtthatthecapacityoftheAfghanresistanceformilitaryaction
would be increased.
Community aid to the Afghan refugees
with regard to community aid to the refugees in Pakistan, in 1981
amounted to:
(a) EmergencY aid 15 MECU
(b) Food aid (through WFP and UNHCR)
2O,OOO t cereals 3'5 MECU
' 3,ooo t milk Powder I.87 MECU
t,O5O t butteroil I'45 l'lECU
transPort 1'OO IttECU
21.82 I4ECU $ 24 million (excluding transport)
4.
it
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InI979-Sototataidtotherefugeesamountedto$22.8miIlion,
making a total since the crisis began of' nearly $47 million'
ItisinterestingtonotethattheCommunityanditsl4emberstates
gavenolessthanathirdofallrequiredaidin}979-80.Although
theproportioniaconsiderab}ylessin198},theComrnunity'scontribution,
as Community, is nevertheless higher in absolute terms'
In]'gS2,afurtheremergencyaidworth633,ooo..EcUwasapprovedby
theCommission.Afurtherrequestforaidbythereliefagenciesshould
be received shortly and can be expected to be of the same order of
magnitude as in Previous Years'
IthasnotbeenpossibletoexaminewhethertheCommunity,said
to the Afghan refugees is proportionate to the hardships suffered
by those living in the camps' This question will have to be dealt
withinafuturerePortwhenthePakistanauthoritieshaveliftedthe
ban imPosed on Your raPPorteur'
5. cornmunity aid to Pakistan
InviewoftheadmissionofAfghanrefugeesbythePakistan
authorities and the effects which this may have on the countryrs
economy, Pakistan has been granted aid by the Community'
Itshouldbenotedthatlg8lwasa,concentration'yearforaid
to pakistan which amounts to ?.8 !,IECU for food and I4.7 I'{ECU for financial
and technical aid or a total of $24.8 million'
Inlg82thefinancialandtechnica}assistancewillamounttolo-12
millionEcUaccordingtotheprojecl.schosen.Foodaidwillberather
less than in previous years and confined to dairy products owing to the
current self-sufficiency of Pakistan in wheat'
on the international scene, Pakistan is maintaining a relatively
firmattitudetowardstheUSSR.Itshouldbenote4.,however,thatPakistan
is concerned by the presence of Soviet forces at its borders and
naturally wishes to avoid any pointless acts of provocation' Pakistani
diplomats in Europe go Bo far as to issue official denials that Afghan
resistance leaders are all0wed to remain on Pakistan's territory'
ItshouldbeborneinmindthattheprovinceofBaluchistanwould
beaprimetargetfortheSovietUnioninitsplanstoreachthelndian
ocean. Any unrest in that province would provide the ussR with an opening'
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The following is an account of Pakistan's official positidn.
president zia,s policy can be summed up by a quotation from a
recent interview: 'ure have now asked the USA to please identify its
interests in our reqionr.
In other words Zia considers that his country is now in the front
line vis-,i-vis the Soviets and he wants to establish a direct relationship
between his foreign policy and the amount of aid he receives from the
western Powers.
in pakistan's view any solution of the Afghan situation has to
be based on the following four principles:
- Soviet troops to withdraw, not by force but by persuasion
- the Afghan people should determine for themselves their
future regime and constitution
- restoration of the oon-aligned Moslem status of Afghanistan
- return of all refugees to Afghanistan tin peace and honour'.
fn pakistanrs view this would be achieved by bilateral talks through
an intermediary such as the UN Secretary-General, the culmination of
such talks being an inteinational conference (this approach is somewhat
weaker than the resolutions suPPorted by the Western powers).
G . The lrlest's reply
The VJest is no'L short of ways and means to try to persuade the
Soviet Union i,o withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. The international
cornmunicy, excluding the Warsaw Pact countries but including all {:he
countries of the Third hlorld, strongly deplored the invasion (UN
resolution of L4 January 1980). The Arab and Islamic countries,
including some which are friendly to the USSR, have also expressed
disapproval. (Egypt is reporEed to have sent arms to the rebels and
Saudi Arabia material aid).
Finally, the !{estern Communist part.ies, bar the French Comrnunist Party,
have condemned the intervention. China, which has a conrmon frontier with
AfghanisLan, has stated that it will help the Afghan rebels on humanitarian,
political and oiher grounds
Nonetheless, this apparent unanimity has not led to the creation
of a common front capable of making the USSR withdraw.
The motion for a resolution included in this report is designed to
give a new irnpetus to a European Community initiative taken in the context.
of political cooperation in an effort to ensure that at the very least
Soviet intervention results in problems for Lhe USSR itself.
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ii,ffiii"tr,.reco9nitionoftheAfghanresistance.
Of course, it is not easy for a group of countries to grant inLernational
recognition to uncoordinated resistance movements inspired by different' not
to say contradictory, ideals. Nor is it easy to give a European 'blessing'
Lo movements which perhaps do not all have the same conception of human rights
astheWest.Norisiteasytooffermoralsupporttoaplethora'of
organizations not united under one command. Finally, there is a danger that
subversive organizations throughout the world mighi claim European endorse-
ment.
ButyourraPporteurfeels,however,thatitshouldbepossibleto
solve all these problems if the community shows itself able to remain
resolute on the principles behind its action, in particular on the demand
that resistance movements must resPect human rights' But above all' moral
support frorn Europe in the form of recognition would probably lead to the
various Afghan movements setting up a united structure capable of receiving
Western aid.
It is, however, clear that we should be able to go further and enable
the Afghans to reoccupy their country and pursue their real aim of national
liberation. When a responsible couniry wishes to give aid to a resistance
movement, it cannot act openly. States do not act directly, as we may see
from the examples of the chinese'volunteersr fight.ing in l(orea, the policy
of sanctuary adopted by Tunisia and l'iorocco during the Algerian war and the
supply of arms to the Vietnamese and the l(hrner Rouge " '
The USSR should feel the tJest's disapproval economically. The old
theory that good commercial relations finally improve political relations
is well and truty discredited. Nowadays, unfortunately, only economib
pressure can bring results. Of courser €lnY threat concerning food aid
could not replace genuine policy, and it is morally difficullL to support
ii. on -.he other hand, if t.he supply of advanced tcchnol0gy to the ussR
were made dependent on the international situation, the ussR's military
power might be reduced.
Politically,yourraPPorteurfeelsthattheWest'andEuropein
particular, should set out a number of principles which would convince
the ussR that it will not obtain the west's agreement to its occupation
of Afghanistan, whatever guarantees it might offer in exchange. The
Helsinki conference specifically recognized the occupation of the Baltic
states. we must state that there will never be a Helsinki for Afghanistan'
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The European community is very sensitive to matters affectin, 
"..u[in Southern Asia, South-West Asia, the persian Gulf and the entire MiddleEast' simirarryr European security is the key to rear coexistence withthe ussR. tpermanentr negot,iations with the ussR mu6t therefore bemaintained' But these negotiations should be seen as primarily concerningthe Afghan question which is the major obstacle to peace. rt wourd arsobe worthwhile eraptoying apparently synbolic measures whose purpose wouLdbe quite different. For example, ar.l sunmit negotiations shourd bedefelred untir the ussR has given a practicar demonstration of itsintention to withdraw from Afghanistan.
That does not mean, however, that we should not show the USSR waysin which it courd make an honourable withdrawal. since Moscow fearedthat pakistan might be americanized, it rnight bE appropriate to givecertain guarantees on the lirestrs commitment to pakistan, in line withthe proposars arready submitted by the European community. simirarry,the unforeseeable development of events in Iran, which worries not onlythe USSR but also the entire West, should make both sides act withrestraint. As for the situation in the persian Gurf, it seems that noone can offer a guarantee to anyone else. There remains Afghanistanitself. would it be possibre to make it a neutrar country like Austria?can we imagine that the Afghan peopre courd determine their own futurein complete freedom once the Russian t.roops had withdrawn? Have thereever been free elections in that country?
::: ::* 
l" 
"""tiin, t uaopii,,s ; ,.";";=lble attirude vis_i_visthe ussR in the matter of aighanistan and in particurar by recognizing thelegitimacy of, the Afghan resistance, the wegt could Iimit the dangerousimpact of a policy inspired partly by the soviet desire for power but alsoby the fear of the future which affects its readers. whole nations cannotbe subjugated with impunity.
The two measures proposed in the aforegoing resolution aim principallyat defining the framework outside which the current uncertain situationcould not be maintained. The European Community, and the European parliamentin particular, can play an important role in an alarming situation.
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